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The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 after 47 years of membership. If a No-Deal Brexit becomes a reality, it may not only be a sore 
awakening for Boris Johnson and his government, but 
also for the United Kingdom as a whole. In this paper, 
I will examine UK scepticism over Europe as a long-
established phenomenon as well as the failure over 
the withdrawal agreement and the problems with the 
poorly executed UK strategy for Brexit negotiations. 
I will then look at how a No-Deal Brexit scenario will 
complicate the economic and political consequences 
for Ireland, and the associated repercussions for trade 
negotiations for the UK with the United States. The 
historic commitment by the US government to the 
peace process in Northern Ireland is a factor, but in 
addition the Irish American vote matters in US national 
politics (Laird, 2020). This paper concludes with an 
examination of how an Irish American congressional 
lobby that is worried about the integrity of the Good 
Friday Agreement would block a UK-US trade deal 
(Ryan, 2019; Lynch 2019b).
The phenomenon of British exceptionalism towards 
the European Union has taken a dramatic turn. With the 
right-wing populist Boris Johnson taking the country’s 
premiership, Britain’s Trumpian moment has arrived. 
Having left the EU, the UK is now in the transition period 
that will last until the end of 2020 and negotiations on 
a trade agreement with the EU-27 are underway (Ryan, 
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2019; Bloomfield, 2019). It is unlikely that there will be 
any room for big compromises during the final stages of 
negotiations this autumn. Without compromise No-Deal 
is still the most likely outcome. With the global economy 
in recession and the COVID-19 crisis still not resolved 
this is bad economic news for both the UK and EU.
BREXIT—ENDGAME OF THE 
RELUCTANT EUROPEAN?—THE 
PHASE OF SCEPTICISM 1945-2016
The EU referendum vote on 23 June 2016 represented 
the biggest political decision many British voters have 
made in their lifetime. The British public in turn delivered 
a result that can easily be classified as one of the biggest 
recent political shocks (Armstrong, 2017). 
The referendum revealed deep popular disaffection 
with the European Union, in particular on the part of 
working-class communities that felt that they had been 
left behind (Shipman, 2016). Some of the roots of this 
disaffection may lie elsewhere—in national government 
austerity policies or in the effects of globalisation more 
generally (Goodwin and Heath. 2016). The disaffection 
was exploited by opportunistic politicians, such as Boris 
Johnson and Nigel Farage (Gifford, 2017).
The potential implications of Brexit were even 
more significant as the UK was far from being ‘any’ EU 
Member State. It was the third-most populous of the 
28 members, accounting in 2016 for around 13 per 
cent of its population. It was, with a share of 16 per 
cent of the EU’s collective GDP in 2016, the second-
biggest economy. Accounting for 27 per cent of all 
military spending of EU members in 2015, it was, by this 
definition, the biggest EU military power. With France, 
the only other EU Member State with a comparable 
military power projection capacity, it was one of only two 
EU members with a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council and with nuclear weapons. The implications 
of Brexit were doubtless bigger for the UK itself than 
for the 27 remaining Member States. But Brexit also 
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threatened to diminish the EU’s (arguably 
already declining) international weight and 
influence (Webber, 2018).  History shows 
that three spheres of interest originally 
governed the British official attitude: the 
UK’s relationship to the United States, the 
Commonwealth and then Europe. Europe 
became more important to the UK as it 
became more successful economically and 
to a lesser extent politically (Ryan, 2016).
Most Prime Ministers of the UK defended 
and enhanced British exceptionalism, and 
the permanent niche the country had carved 
out: within the Single Market and Customs 
Union, but outside the European Monetary 
Union and other European integration 
arrangements. There was a strong belief up 
until the referendum in 2016 that this set up 
was in the UK’s best interest.
Britain became the Reluctant European 
under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) who 
was known for her confrontational style, and 
who negotiated a budget rebate for Britain. 
She was in favour of enlargement but 
resisted closer European integration as well 
as the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). 
Thatcher wanted floating exchange rates 
instead. Britain became a member of the 
ERM in 1990, against Margaret Thatcher’s 
wishes. A month after Britain had joined 
the ERM, Margaret Thatcher had to resign 
as Prime Minister.   Successor John Major 
(1990-1997) represented the British view of 
widening rather than deepening European 
integration (Ryan, 2016; Thatcher, 2003).
Under Major in December 1991, 
the Maastricht Treaty was signed.  On 
16 September 1992, so-called “Black 
Wednesday” happened which saw the UK exit 
Table 1: Key dates
Year Event
1957 The EEC (The Treaty of Rome) is set up
1961 & 1967 British applications for EEC membership
1963 & 1967 French veto against British membership
1971 Third British application for EEC membership
1973 Britain becomes a member of the EEC under Prime Minister Edward
1974 Harold Wilson’s Labour party defeated Edward Heath’s Conservatives 
in February 1974 and formed a minority government and then won an 
overall majority in October 1974. Labour promised that it would give the 
British people the final say on EEC membership, which would be binding 
on the government—through the ballot box—on whether the UK accept 
the terms and stay in or reject the terms and come out.
1975 In the referendum Britain votes in favour of continued membership (66% 
voter turnout, 2/3 said yes) (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976).
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from the ERM. This event is not only deeply 
engrained in the memory of older politicians 
like then-Finance Minister Norman Lamont, 
but also among the younger ones like Prime 
Minister David Cameron who was then a 
special adviser to the Finance Minister. 
The on-going recession and a split within 
the Conservative Party concerning the EU 
dominated UK politics before the 1997 
general election, which the Conservatives 
lost (Ryan, 2016; Kiratli, 2015).
Following the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
adopted the UK’s exit from the EU as the 
distinctive party goal (Lynch and Whitaker, 
2013).   Growing Euroscepticism within the 
wider UK population and a surge of support 
for UKIP also had implications for the UK’s 
stance on Europe. 
Under Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997–
2007), Labour had a more pro-European 
stance. Blair was keen to play a leading, 
constructive role in Europe and New Labour 
were less sceptical towards the EU. But 
declining popularity due to the Iraq war 
weakened his premiership. Finance minister 
Gordon Brown, who later succeeded Blair 
as Prime Minister (2007-2010) was rather 
lukewarm regarding the EU. Cameron 
(2010-15) was first elected in a coalition 
government with the pro-European Liberal 
Democrats until the Conservative Party won 
a majority in May 2015 (Glencross, 2016). 
In the 2009 European Parliament 
elections, UKIP came in second, while it won 
the 2014 European Parliament elections 
with a vote share of 26.6%. As UKIP became 
a significant political player, it started to 
pose a threat to the Conservative Party. 
Indeed, Cameron decided to hold an ‘in–out’ 
referendum on the UK membership of the 
EU, though it was labelled as an “advisory 
referendum” which was not constitutionally 
binding (Ryan, 2016; Glencross, 2016). 
This decision was a tactical move to try 
and win over UKIP voters in the run-up to 
the 2015 general elections. The surge of 
support for Nigel Farage and UKIP and the 
victory for the leave campaign in the EU 
referendum emboldened and strengthened 
the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative 
Party, providing it substantial political clout 
within the Party.
Prime Minister Cameron was primarily 
to blame for the referendum outcome. He 
initially endorsed the idea in 2013 of an ‘in-
out’ referendum after a planned attempt to 
renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the 
EU. Cameron in his Bloomberg speech in 
January 2013 pledged to stage an ‘in–out’ 
referendum on the UK’s EU membership if 
the Conservatives won the 2015 elections. 
Cameron explained his proposal by arguing 
that the EU that would emerge from the 
Eurozone crisis was going to be a ‘very 
different body’ to the one that the British 
had voted to join in 1975. Before staging 
a referendum, the government would 
negotiate a ‘new settlement’ of the UK’s 
membership terms with ‘our European 
partners’ (Cameron, 2013).
Cameron duly submitted his requests 
for renegotiation to his European partners 
in November 2015, and by February 
2016 an agreement was reached at the 
European Council under the four headings 
of Cameron’s requests (BBC News, 2016) 
(see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Requests for renegotiation
Position of  
non-Eurozone  
member states
Discrimination between Euro and non-
Euro economic actors prohibited.
Competitiveness Better regulation, lowering of administrative burdens.
Social benefits & free 
movement of workers
Safeguard mechanism, restricting non-contributory 
in-work benefits for four years. Member states 
control over benefits for non-active EU migrants.
Sovereignty Ever-closer union of peoples not a legal basis for 
extending EU competencies. All member states do not 
have to aim at a common destination, with recognition 
that the UK does not want further political integration. 
Role of national parliaments enhanced with a new ‘red 
card’ mechanism (55% of vote trigger) (Ryan, 2016).
The agreement did not resonate with 
the British public and, combined with a 
complacent Remain campaign, led to the 
pro-Brexit result in the referendum (Scott, 
2017). On the morning after the referendum 
(Clarke et al, 2017), Cameron announced 
he would be standing down to allow a new 
Prime Minister to prepare the negotiation 
with the EU. “Above all,” he said, “this will 
require strong, determined and committed 
leadership” (Martin, 2016). On July 11, 
2016, the Conservative Party chose Theresa 
May to replace him. Prime Minister May’s 
record on Brexit revealed a high degree of 
opportunism, a certain skill in calculating 
domestic political odds, and a willingness 
to risk the economic well-being of the 
British people for short-term political self-
interest and for the interest of her party 
(Shipman, 2016).
A recurring theme of this section is the 
failure of successive generations of British 
politicians to make a positive case for 
Europe. At best, membership was portrayed 
as a grim necessity (Wall, 2020).
NO-DEAL BREXIT 
CONSEQUENCES FOR IRELAND
Brexit was not inevitable. It was most of all 
the outcome of multi-generational failures 
of British political leadership. (Sobolewska 
and Ford, 2020). The Republic of Ireland will 
be hit hardest politically and economically 
by a No-Deal Brexit, while the opportunity for 
unity may also become a probability. 
A No-Deal Brexit (Walker and Elgot, 
2019) and the threats to the Good Friday 
agreement (McDonald, 2019) could 
force the people of Northern Ireland to 
consider a border poll and the possibility 
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of a United Ireland (Whysall, 2019). One possibility 
might be a border poll in Northern Ireland concurrent 
with a constitutional referendum in the Republic of 
Ireland. The interim constitutional arrangements 
would preserve the status quo within Northern Ireland 
as much as possible, continuing both devolution and 
compulsory power-sharing, but swapping the roles 
played by Dublin and London. The political dynamics 
unleashed by Brexit may make a border poll inevitable. 
The Republic of Ireland referendum would redefine the 
national territory to include Northern Ireland, but would 
then also prescribe interim constitutional arrangements 
and a set of more extensive constitutional changes 
that would apply five years later by default with a new 
constitution being enacted by plebiscite on an all-island 
basis. Planning for a possible vote for a United Ireland 
in both jurisdictions would be needed (Doyle, 2019).
Aside from the political repercussions, a No-Deal 
Brexit would cause considerable damage to the Irish 
economy, and there is little doubting that this would 
cause problems back in Britain, too. Although, as the 
Irish economist David McWilliams has noted, trade 
between Ireland and the UK has fallen from 91% of Irish 
exports in 1953 to 11% today, the Irish-British partnership 
remains of central importance to Britain. Ireland is the 
UK’s fifth largest export market, and the UK exports 
more to Ireland than it does to China. Furthermore, the 
UK runs a large trade surplus with Ireland—in fact, it is 
the UK’s second-largest trade surplus after the US. The 
idea that Brexit will give way to a “Global Britain,” which 
does not need Europe, is unlikely (McWilliams, 2019).
In addition to facing economic distress and enduring 
political instability, Ireland may also have to fight to 
ensure its standing in the EU. In a post-Brexit scenario, 
there are concerns that commercial interests in the UK 
would be able to smuggle goods into the EU’s single 
market through the Northern Ireland land border that 
do not meet EU standards and that evade EU tariffs. In 
such a case, Ireland may be forced to harden its border 
with the rest of the EU (Ryan, 2019; Parker et al, 2020).
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The UK Government has repeatedly 
stated that it would not ask for or agree 
to an extension of the transition period—
referring to the Conservative manifesto 
commitment.  Indeed, the Government went 
so far as to legislate to prohibit itself from 
agreeing an extension with the EU. As things 
stand, the transition period will expire, and 
the UK will exit the EU single market and 
customs union on 31 December 2020. 
10 Downing Street has stated, ‘the 
transition period ends on 31 December 2020, 
as enshrined in UK law, which the Prime 
Minister has made clear he has no intention 
of changing’. A U-turn from the UK therefore 
remains a remote possibility despite the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and the UK’s ambitious 
timetable  ruling out an extension to the 
transition period remains to be a key driver 
of the UK’s negotiation strategy. A number of 
observations on the UK stance—as viewed 
from outside the negotiating team—have 
been described as the UK Government was 
“running down the clock” on reaching a deal 
with the EU (Jerzewska, 2020).
It has become clear under Boris Johnson 
since his election victory in December 2019 
that the interpretation of the  Withdrawal 
Agreement’s Protocol  on Ireland/Northern 
Ireland differs between the UK and the EU. 
The Command Paper published by the UK 
seems to cement these differences. The 
Command Paper does not fully address the 
challenges which come from the special 
situation around the Irish border. It attempts 
to determine how the UK Government 
envisages the Protocol might be 
implemented and suggests some solutions, 
but these will need to be agreed with the 
EU, and that will not be straightforward 
(Gasiorek and Jerzewska, 2020).
The substantive differences 
concern  which goods  will be subject to 
checks, on which flows, and how the checks 
will be carried out to the satisfaction of 
both the UK and the EU; and relatedly, 
what infrastructure and institutions are 
needed. With talks between the UK and the 
EU seemingly at an impasse, the outlook 
is bleak for businesses and consumers 
alike in Northern Ireland, and it is ordinary 
people who will be hit the hardest by price 
increases for daily essentials (Gasiorek and 
Jerzewska, 2020).
The agreement of the revised Protocol 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland in October 2019 
paved the way for the UK to leave the EU on 
31 January 2020. Yet the months since then 
have been characterised by uncertainty. On 
the one hand, the UK Government has been 
unable to explain precisely or consistently 
what it agreed with the EU. On the other hand, 
the EU’s insistence that ‘the rules are the 
rules’ has left Northern Ireland businesses 
fearing that there will be no flexibility to apply 
the Protocol proportionately. The House of 
Lords  European Union Committee  report 
warns that time is running out for the 
Government to provide certainty to Northern 
Ireland business and stakeholders before the 
Protocol becomes operational on 1 January 
2021. Without clear and prompt guidance 
from the Government, and a proportionate 
approach to the application of the Protocol 
by the EU, there remains a real and present 
danger of Northern Ireland becoming 
collateral damage of Brexit (European Union 
Committee, 2020).
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The UK on 12 June 2020 formally rejected 
the option to extend its post-Brexit transition 
period beyond the end of this year, leaving 
companies with a matter of months 
to prepare for more restrictive trading 
conditions with the EU. UK Cabinet Office 
minister Michael Gove said he had “formally 
confirmed” the decision during talks with 
Brussels, stating on Twitter: “On 1 January 
2021 we will take back control and regain 
our political and economic independence” 
(Brunsden and Payne 2020).
The big difference between leaving the 
EU with no trade deal in December 2020, 
as opposed to in March or October 2019 
is that there is agreement between the UK 
and the EU in the legally binding Withdrawal 
Agreement on the regime for the trade in 
goods between Northern Ireland and the EU 
(European Union Committee, 2020).
The UK is legally obliged to be ready 
for the new system by the end of the year, 
which means introducing a customs and 
regulatory border between Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland to ensure that goods 
entering Northern Ireland can circulate freely 
in the island of Ireland (with no customs or 
regulatory border) without compromising 
the EU’s Single Market or Customs Union. 
The implementation of the Protocol is being 
discussed in the Joint Committee where the 
UK co-chair is Michael Gove, the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster. This will require 
goodwill and flexibility on both sides, even 
in the event of the failure of the wider UK-EU 
negotiations on the future relationship, and 
the inevitable tension and acrimony that this 
is likely to generate. The fact that the Brexit 
negotiations concluded with a Protocol 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland remains an 
impressive achievement. The overriding 
imperatives were conservation and 
preservation, in terms of finding solutions 
that would as much as possible secure a 
reasonable measure of stability in Northern 
Ireland (European Union Committee, 2020). 
Meanwhile, the British government has 
abandoned its plan to introduce full border 
checks with the EU on January 1, 2021 as 
ministers come under mounting pressure 
from business not to compound the chaos 
caused by COVID-19. In a significant policy 
U-turn, Gove has accepted that businesses 
cannot be expected to cope with COVID-19 
and simultaneously face the prospect of 
disruption at the border at the end of the 
post-Brexit transition period. Instead of full 
checks, the government will now introduce 
a temporary light-touch regime at UK ports 
such as Dover for incoming EU goods, under 
both a deal and No-Deal scenario. However, 
officials concede that goods flowing to the 
EU from the UK are likely to face full checks 
as they enter France, for example in the case 
of the port of Dover (Foster and Parker, 2020).
The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement 
for Brexit means there will be no hard 
border or customs border on the island 
of Ireland between the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland. The Withdrawal 
Agreement was negotiated between the UK 
and the EU after Britain voted to leave the 
EU and included provisions to maintain a 
seamless border between the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. This seamless 
border between the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland was originally negotiated 
between the UK and Ireland as part of the 
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Northern Ireland peace process culminating in the 
Good Friday Agreement / Belfast Agreement (1998) - an 
agreement or treaty that essentially underpins the peace 
process in Northern Ireland. 
The fact that both UK and the Republic of Ireland 
were in the EU when this Agreement was negotiated 
made everything a lot easier. Now that the UK is out of 
the EU, and as a result of the Good Friday Agreement 
and the Withdrawal Agreement, there will have to be 
a customs border between Northern Ireland and the 
rest of the UK rather than between the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, which would be the logical 
situation given that the Republic of Ireland is in the EU 
and Northern Ireland is in the UK. 
Boris Johnson signed up in 2019 and boasted about 
it being a fantastic deal for Britain as it is leaving the 
EU. However, the UK Government is now concerned 
that having a customs border between one part of the 
UK and another part of the UK undermines the unity and 
integrity of the UK and subjects its internal trade to a 
degree of control by the EU that undermines the whole 
idea of Brexit. 
THE 2020 IRISH REPUBLIC 
ELECTION RESULT HAS RECAST 
IRELAND’S POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Ireland’s political landscape has now been redrawn. 
Sinn Féin has won the popular vote in the Irish election, 
securing 24.5 percent of first preferences in the country’s 
electoral system of single transferable votes. Opposition 
party Fianna Fáil came second with 22.2 percent, and 
Leo Varadkar’s ruling Fine Gael a dismal third on 20.9 
percent. As far as seat distribution is concerned, Fianna 
Fáil received 38 seats, down 6 seats in 2016. Sinn Féin 
won 37 seats, up 14 on 2016, and Fine Gael dropped 
16 seats to end up with 35 seats. This means that Fine 
Gael had the third worst vote result in its history (after 
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1944 and 1948), while, for Fianna Fail, it was the second 
worst ever (after its post-crash humiliation in 2011).
During the 2019 UK election, Unionists suffered 
notable losses in Northern Ireland. The DUP, whose 10 
members of parliament (MPs) had propped up May’s 
government, lost its leverage in Westminster. This 
includes the loss of two seats to nationalists, including 
its parliamentary leader’s seat to Sinn Féin. Support 
increased for the cross-community Alliance Party, which 
won one seat. The nationalist Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) won two seats, one from the DUP 
and one from Sinn Féin. Notably, there are now more 
nationalist MPs from Northern Ireland (9) than unionists 
(8)—a reverse from the 11 to 7 split in 2017 (Ryan, 2020; 
Hayward, 2020).
The Ulster Unionists, the SDLP and Alliance parties 
joined Sinn Féin and the DUP after signing up to the 
deal brokered by the British and Irish governments1 
which overcame the stalemate in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly dating from January 2017 when Sinn Féin 
withdrew from power-sharing, accusing the DUP of 
arrogance, bad faith and sleaze (Beesley, 2020a). The 
almost unanimous view in the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland is that Boris Johnson’s attitude to 
Northern Ireland is at best indifference. This view was 
only strengthened by the dismissal of Julian Smith 
as Northern Ireland secretary just over a month after 
he oversaw the resumption of the Northern Ireland 
assembly (Carroll 2020).  
The Republic of Ireland’s general election took place 
on 8 February. Sinn Féin’s vote share increased by 10.7 
percentage points, making it the most popular party. 
This is the first time it has achieved this distinction; it 
will not be the largest party in the Irish Parliament (Dáil 
Éireann) only because it did not run enough candidates 
to capitalise on its surge in popularity. In 2019, it had 
1  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_
decade__a_new_approach.pdf
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very poor local and European Parliament 
elections, losing half of its local councillors, 
which made its success in the general 
election even more surprising.
The result is part of a story that began 
more than a decade ago with the economic 
crisis, spending cuts and tax increases, 
and the intervention of the IMF and EU 
with a multi-lateral ‘bailout’ loan in late 
2010. Fianna Fáil and the Green Party, 
which were in government at the time, 
were severely punished by the electorate 
at the general election in 2011. Fine Gael 
and Labour also lost swathes of voters 
in 2016, notwithstanding Ireland’s rapid 
economic recovery because they continued 
with a programme of spending cuts and 
tax increases from 2011 onwards (Ryan, 
2020; Leahy, 2016).
From 2016, Fine Gael governed 
with the support of a confidence-and-
supply agreement with Fianna Fáil, which 
effectively supported the minority Fine Gael 
government in parliament. This arrangement 
lasted almost four years—long beyond its 
expected lifetime—partly due to the need for 
political stability to deal with the impact of 
Brexit (Kelly, 2016).
Under the mechanics of Ireland’s 
electoral system, 39 constituencies elect 
between three and five lawmakers each, 
through a single transferable vote. Sinn 
Féin’s election success materialised under 
the leadership of Mary Lou McDonald, 
a Dubliner who replaced veteran Belfast 
leader Gerry Adams in 2018. Since the 
party only put forward 42 candidates to fill 
Ireland’s 160 parliamentary seats. (Ryan, 
2020; Beesley and Hall, 2020).
Sinn Féin rode a wave of anger over 
homelessness, soaring rents, hospital 
waiting lists and fraying public services. 
McDonald offered left-wing solutions, 
such as an ambitious public housing 
building programme, that enthused voters, 
especially those under the age of 50. 
Meanwhile, Varadkar’s attempt to frame 
the election around his Brexit diplomacy 
and the strong economy fell flat. Fianna Fáil 
was contaminated by its confidence-and-
supply deal that had propped up Varadkar’s 
minority administration, leaving Sinn Féin to 
cast itself as the agent of real change.
This extraordinary election result has 
come at a time at which the Republic of 
Ireland is the fastest growing economy 
in the EU. Sinn Féin at its core is the party 
that wants to call a border poll in Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on 
Irish unity. At the same time, it embraces 
multiculturalism, and supported both gay 
marriage and abortion rights. Relations with 
the UK were, until Brexit, as close as they 
have ever been. But Brexit altered the mood. 
Irish people disliked the way Brexiteers 
disregarded Irish concerns.
Brexit itself may in fact have become 
Sinn Féin’s perfect storm: Not only has 
it locked the two larger parties into an 
extended problematic marriage, but  it has 
also left the prospect of a United Ireland 
looking far less remote. Northern Irish voters 
chose Remain in the 2016 referendum but 
are now outside the EU anyway. Faced with 
the choice between two unions—the UK 
or the EU—many north of the border may 
choose unity with the Republic of Ireland in 
the next five years. 
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After positive internal party votes on Ireland’s 
proposed coalition between the Fianna Fáil, 
Fine Gael, and Green Party, a new government 
was formed on 27 June2020, with Fianna Fáil 
leader Micheál Martin serving as Taoiseach 
and Leo Varadkar as Tánaiste (Deputy Prime 
Minister) until December 2022. The position 
of Taoiseach will revert to Leo Varadkar 
and Micheál Martin will become Tánaiste 
until the next election in 2024. Sinn Féin will 
become the main opposition party in Dail 
Eireann (Beesley, 2020b).
Sinn Féin has recast Ireland’s political 
dynamic and installed itself as a third large 
party in what has historically been a two-
party system. One of the main takeaways 
of the 2020 election result will be Sinn 
Féin fundamentally breaking through the 
historical tight grip on Irish politics of the 
two traditional parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael (Ryan, 2020; Beesley and Hall, 2020) 
Some influential Irish Americans 
are looking on in astonishment at the 
demonisation of Sinn Féin by the two leaders 
of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and what seems 
like the majority of Dublin establishment in 
the Republic of Ireland. After decades of 
Irish leaders encouraging Americans to get 
Sinn Féin to do the right thing and become 
full participants in the peace process, the 
political establishment in Ireland is now 
sending out mixed messages. It is fine for 
the unionist DUP to be in government with 
Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, but not for 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in the Republic 
(O’Dowd, 2020).
Former congressman Bruce Morrison, a 
key figure in the American role in the Irish 
peace process, summed up Irish-American 
sentiment best in a recent interview with 
IrishCentral.com: “The continuing attempts 
to quarantine Sinn Féin is a direct attack on 
their democratic mandate and the wishes 
of their voters,” he said. “When we urged 
them forward to ceasefire and disarmament 
. . . we said peaceful politics was the way 
forward. Now that they have done that, the 
previously dominant parties are trying to 
change the subject to the past—It makes no 
sense!” (O’Dowd, 2020).
A JOE BIDEN PRESIDENCY AND 
CONGRESS MAY BLOCK US-UK 
POST-BREXIT TRADE DEAL 
In June 2017, then UK Prime Minister 
Theresa May called an election that lost the 
Conservatives’ parliamentary majority and 
made her party dependent on the DUP to 
form a government. The DUP, a fiercely pro-
union party that had opposed the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement that brought peace to 
the island of Ireland, used its new leverage 
in Parliament to block any differentiated 
status for Northern Ireland after Brexit 
lest it weaken the union. Bowing to the 
DUP’s demands, the Prime Minister tried to 
appease her coalition partners by widening 
the alignment to encompass the UK, not just 
Northern Ireland. This in turn infuriated the 
other Brexiteers. 
After first suggesting the UK would agree 
to some alignment between Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Republic, and subsequently 
suggesting regulatory alignment more 
broadly between the UK and the EU, it was 
clear that May would fail to provide a solution 
to the Irish border issue. For this reason, the 
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European Commission unveiled its own, “the backstop,” 
which would guarantee that the border remains open no 
matter what happened in the future. The backstop would 
ensure that Northern Ireland would remain integrated 
within the EU’s customs union and single market for 
goods, supplemented by an EU-UK customs union, 
until it was rendered unnecessary either by the future 
relationship itself or other means. In layman’s terms, it 
was designed as an insurance policy enabling the UK 
and EU to fulfil their shared commitment to respect the 
Northern Ireland peace agreement by keeping the border 
as open after Brexit as it is now.
Throughout the protracted Brexit saga, the central 
problem has been the Irish border issue, which Brexiteers 
have long avoided to acknowledge. Indeed, at every step 
they have shown a simple lack of concern about the 
communities who rely on the border’s openness for their 
peace and prosperity (Luce, 2019). Even worse, Michael 
Gove, a Conservative cabinet minister tasked in May’s 
government with No-Deal planning, previously authored 
a pamphlet attacking the Good Friday Agreement, 
comparing it to Munich appeasement (Gove, 2000).
In addition, Brexiteers have claimed confidently that 
such inconveniences would prove to be insignificant for 
a scenario in which post-Brexit Britain that was able to 
secure a better and more prosperous trade deal with the 
United States. Indeed, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has 
made a US-UK free trade agreement a guiding ambition of 
his government, and he has claimed that the UK would be 
“first in line to do a great free trade deal” with the Trump 
administration. Across the pond, this fantasy has been 
inflated by President Donald Trump, too, who said in 
late July 2019 that he had spoken to Boris Johnson by 
phone and supported an “ambitious trade agreement” 
with Britain after Brexit. Trump’s message has also 
been echoed by Senator Tom Cotton, a Republican 
from Arkansas, and  44 of his Senate colleagues  who 
sent a letter to Johnson pledging unwavering support 
for the United Kingdom as it exits the European Union 
(Cotton, 2019).
‘‘Throughout the 
protracted Brexit 
saga, the central 
problem has been 
the Irish border issue, 
which Brexiteers 
have long avoided to 
acknowledge.
‘‘
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However, as Boris Johnson and Donald Trump have been 
making their triumphant claims, the Irish Government has 
been building up support among its own allies in the US 
Congress. So far, the Irish are in the stronger position 
in Washington (Donnan, 2019). This has primarily been 
achieved with the help of the Friends of Ireland Caucus 
in the US Congress, which has been an effective advocate 
for Irish interests in the United States and which claims to 
represent the interests of America’s large and politically 
diverse Irish-American constituency (Kennedy, 2019).
Many of the US Congress’ most important officials 
have sided with the Irish on backstop concerns and 
against the British government on a potential trade deal. 
Richard Neal, for example, the chair of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, which has authority over trade 
deals, has said, “Any negotiation of a bilateral trade 
agreement with the UK […] needs a firm commitment 
on no hard border” (Lynch, 2019a).  This has been 
reiterated by Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the US House 
of Representatives, who declared in a speech at the 
London School of Economics: “If there’s any harm to 
the Good Friday accords—no trade treaty”. (RTE News, 
2019) There is also Chuck Schumer, the Democrats’ 
leader in the Senate, who has declared his “inveterate 
opposition to any prospective trade deal with the UK that 
either undermines the landmark Good Friday Agreement 
or facilitates a return to a hard border” (Ryan, 2019).
On 3 November 2019, the US House of 
Representatives voted in favour of a resolution 
which calls for strict adherence to the Good Friday 
Agreement during Brexit negotiations, and was passed 
by unanimous voice vote following a debate. The 
legislation urges the UK and the EU to ensure that Brexit 
does not threaten peace on the island of Ireland and 
strongly opposes the reintroduction of a hard border. 
The bill emphasises that any trade agreement between 
the US and the UK is contingent on meeting the Good 
Friday Agreement’s obligations (The Irish News, 2019).
Even if Johnson and Trump were to have their way, the 
road to a UK-US Free Trade Agreement is a long one. A 
‘‘Nancy Pelosi, 
the Speaker of 
the US House of 
Representatives, 
who declared in 
a speech at the 
London School 
of Economics: “If 
there’s any harm 
to the Good Friday 
accords—no 
trade treaty”.
‘‘
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UK-US Free Trade Agreement, without a pre-
existing framework from which to build, as in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement’s 
(NAFTA) case, will be even tougher to 
negotiate and ratify.  
The prospect of former vice president 
and Irish-American Joe Biden becoming 
President would make it likely that Boris 
Johnson as a friend and political ally 
of President Trump would find it even 
more difficult to achieve a UK-US Free 
Trade Agreement without significant 
compromises (Ryan, 2019).
The dire economic predictions for the 
implications of a No-Deal Brexit will then be 
tested by events, in an environment made 
infinitely more hostile by the consequences 
of COVID-19. The painfully won relative 
stability of Northern Ireland, founded on the 
Good Friday Agreement, will be put at risk, 
an outcome that will arouse opposition in 
the United States. This opposition from 
Congress and other American sources 
will serve to preclude any possibility of a 
favourable trade agreement between the 
USA and UK. The widespread perception of 
the present British government as a “rogue” 
administration will be reinforced by its 
cavalier attitude to the implementation of 
international treaties. 
Brussels put the border on the island 
of Ireland, the only land border between 
the EU and UK, at the very heart of the exit 
negotiations with the UK government. Across 
the Atlantic, key political leaders were quick 
to raise their concerns over the potential 
negative impact of Brexit on the Good Friday 
Agreement. While Boris Johnson and Donald 
Trump have made bold statements about their 
ambitions for a US-UK free trade agreement, 
those plans may get hampered by the House 
of Representatives which has expressed its 
determination to preserve peace on the island 
of Ireland. In any case the negotiations on a 
UK-US free trade deal have been postponed 
indefinitely due to the  COVID-19 crisis and 
the presidential election.
Since the beginning of his candidacy, 
Joe Biden has voiced his support for 
protecting the Good Friday agreement 
and recent developments in the EU-UK 
negotiations have only hardened his resolve. 
They equally appear to have hardened the 
resolve of other prominent Democrats in 
Congress and, perhaps more important, to 
have generated new scrutiny in the US of the 
UK’s policies with regard to Northern Ireland. 
Trade negotiations with the US post-Brexit, 
under any administration, will therefore be 
far more complex. The added complexity 
over the border issue on the island of Ireland 
is something that the UK government may 
have chosen to downplay but it would be 
propelled into the limelight if a No-Deal 
Brexit scenario came true (Stephens, 2020).
After the Johnson government 
introduced the Internal Market Bill, which 
put the UK’s commitment to the Withdrawal 
Agreement in question, the EU is asking 
how they can continue to negotiate with 
a government whose signature cannot be 
trusted. Goodwill among the EU-27 towards 
the British government is at an all-time 
low. The bill does not seek to eliminate 
the customs border in the Irish Sea that 
Johnson agreed to last October—merely to 
weaken aspects of it. Nevertheless, the bill 
has led to fears in Dublin and elsewhere that 
Johnson may ultimately seek to scrap that 
entire border. The prime minister’s dislike of 
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the Withdrawal Agreement is heart-felt. That 
treaty contradicted the pledge that he had 
earlier given to the DUP that he would never 
allow a border in the Irish Sea. 
To claim that this step is being taken 
in the interests of Northern Ireland risks 
making a mockery of the finely tuned 
balance and common values the Good 
Friday Agreement was intended to uphold. 
Biden fired a shot across Boris Johnson’s 
bow by warning him that a trade agreement 
with the US was incompatible with his Brexit 
negotiation strategy. He has sided with the 
EU by claiming that peace on the island 
of Ireland was at risk from the UK Internal 
Market Bill, which provides powers to 
override the Withdrawal Agreement in order 
to prevent trade barriers in the Irish Sea.
“We can’t allow the Good Friday 
Agreement that brought peace to Northern 
Ireland to become a casualty of Brexit,” he 
tweeted. “Any trade deal between the US and 
UK must be contingent upon respect for the 
Agreement and preventing the return of a 
hard border. Period.” He was not just fishing 
for Irish American votes. That is the firm 
position of his party and a large portion of 
America’s political class.” (Chao-Fong, 2020).
Biden is himself part of the Irish American 
lobby. “The Irish cause is in his veins,” a 
former aide, Shailagh Murray, told the New 
York Times (Landler, 2020). He often cites 
Yeats and in his acceptance speech for the 
Democratic nomination in August, he quoted 
lines by Irish poet and playwright Seamus 
Heaney, adding: “This is our moment to make 
hope and history rhyme.” Biden’s cultural 
and political hinterland is suffused with Irish 
nationalism. In any Anglo-Irish dispute, he 
will instinctively take the Irish side. 
US president Donald Trump’s special envoy 
to Northern Ireland, Mick Mulvaney, has 
warned against creating a “hard border by 
accident” on the island of Ireland (Boffey, 
2020). In response to the proposed Internal 
Market Bill, Mulvaney went a step further, 
saying in an interview with the Financial 
Times: “The Trump administration, State 
Department and the US Congress would 
all be aligned in the desire to see the Good 
Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement) 
preserved to see the lack of a border 
maintained” (Beesley and Payne, 2020).
The casual ignorance about US 
congressional politics and Northern Ireland 
seems widespread in Westminster and 
the UK media. There have been British 
critics of Joe Biden’s comments regarding 
the Good Friday agreement, accusing 
him of not understanding the situation 
in Northern Ireland and interfering in 
UK domestic politics (Polley, 2020, Gray 
2020).  The fact of the matter is that there 
will be no trade deal between the US-UK 
unless the Irish dimension is resolved to 
Dublin’s satisfaction. 
CONCLUSION
A No-Deal Brexit is an unpredictable outcome 
that poses a risk to the financial stability 
of the UK, EU and beyond. Regardless of 
how EU leaders choose to answer the 
questions posed by Brexit, the instability and 
uncertainty will not end anytime soon. Britain 
became the first country ever to leave the 
28-nation European Union. Prime Minister 
Boris Johnson says these negotiations must 
conclude by 31 December 2020, meaning 
a No-Deal Brexit if they are not, with Britain 
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leaving on “most favoured nation” terms 
under World Trade Organisation rules. 
These are the same rules under which 
Britain currently operates much of its global 
trade, including with China, Russia, and the 
United States, and is therefore a feasible 
default position.
While this would leave the UK free to 
pursue a domestic and international agenda 
without hindrance by EU rules, the immediate 
disruption, including an unavoidable hard 
border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, 
will make for a very uncomfortable position 
economically and politically. 
Prime Minister Johnson has so far 
chosen to ignore the border issues on the 
island of Ireland. Worse, his new Internal 
Market Bill—a proposal that would hinder the 
effectiveness of the withdrawal agreement— 
signals reckless willingness to violate 
international law in service to his Brexit 
ambitions. It is time for the UK government 
to realize that failure to meet its obligations 
under the Good Friday Agreement could 
seriously spoil its ‘Global Britain’ vision, 
including any ambitions of a comprehensive 
trade agreement with the US. 
Nothing will happen quickly on a UK-
US trade deal during the 2020 election 
campaign. So in a hard Brexit/No-Deal 
scenario, Brexiteers who claim that a 
US-UK trade deal will be the solution or 
compensation for strained economic 
relations with the EU are not being realistic, 
while the UK would find itself isolated from 
not only one but two of its key allies. 
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